

FAILURES AND MISCONCEPTIONS

• AIM OF THE TALK

- -DESCRIBE FAILURES
- -SHOW THEIR ORIGIN (MISCONCEPTIONS)
- -DETERMINE WHAT WAS WRONG

-DRAW ATTENTION ON BEHAVIOR/PROCEDURES LEADING TO FAILURE

• CONTENT

- OPERATION EXAMPLES
- •THE LHC BELLOWS
- •CORROSION

• THANKS

- TO MY COLLEAGUES
- FOR THEIR HELP IN COMPLETING THAT PRESENTATION:
- THE METALLURGICAL SECTION :S. SGOBBA, JP BACHER, G. ARNAU
- C. HAUVILLER, M. JIMEMEZ, P.STRUBIN, K. ZAPFE

N. HILLERET Failures and misconceptions

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• GREAT VARIETY OF PROBLEMS

-FAULTY COMPONENTS -PROCEDURES AND CONTROL

• EXAMPLES -THE SPS SUPERCONDUCTING CAVITY -THE LEP ENERGY UPGRADE -MISCELLANEOUS

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
• THE SPS SC. CAVITY:

-THE EVENTS

•0 mn VACUUM ALARM: ION PUMPS SWITCHED OFF AND SECTOR VALVES CLOSED

• 12 mn LATER: CRYO ALARM: COMPRESSOR STOPPED

- •35 mn :ALARM LOW He IN CAVITY
- •39 mn : VACUUM ALARM SECTOR VALVES CLOSED AROUND CAVITY



CONSEQUENCES


• AFTER COOL DOWN CAVITY HAS LOST RESONANCE!

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• RECOVERED AFTER COMPLETE WARM UP AND RECOOLING (CONDENSED GAS THICKNESS)

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- THE SPS SC. CAVITY:
 - -ANALYSIS
 - THE PROTON BEAM MADE A HOLE IN THE VACUUM CHAMBER
 - SOME VALVES CLOSED, NOT THOSE BETWEEN THE HOLE AND THE CAVITY (NEEDS 3 BAD ION PUMP SIGNALS)
 - •FINALLY WHEN THE LIQUID HELIUM LEVEL WAS LOST THE SECTOR VALVES AFTER THE CAVITY CLOSED AND AVOIDED FURTHER PROPAGATION



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• THE SPS SC. CAVITY: **-FAULTS AND REMEDIES** •FOR HISTORICAL REASONS INTERLOCKS WERE SET AT MAXIMUM (P.P., 80^{IES}), A 3S DELAY WAS INTRODUCED TO ELIMINATE FALSE TRIGGERS AGING POWER SUPPLIES : NO MORE ABLE TO DELIVER FULL CURRENT => =>INTERLOCK LEVEL NO MORE REACHABLE • FAST VALVES WERE OPENED DESPITE BAD PRESSURE

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• THE SPS SC. CAVITY:

-LESSONS

- INTERLOCK LEVELS DEPENDS ON THE OPERATION CONDITIONS
- THEY MUST BE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED AND KEPT TO A MINIMUM COMPATIBLE WITH SAFE OPERATION
- TOO MANY INTERLOCKS => BY-PASS
- A BY-PASSED INTERLOCK IS MORE DANGEROUS THAN NO INTERLOCK

• THE LEP ENERGY UPGRADE: -GRADUAL ENERGY INCREASE

> •FROM 45 GEV (1989) TO 100 GEV (1999) (i.e. 40->1000 W/m)

• SOME COMPONENTS DESIGNED FOR 45 GEV FORGOTTEN (UNCOOLED TRANSITIONS ELLIPTICAL-> CIRCULAR)

• INAPPROPRIATE FOR USE ABOVE 90 GEV (SYNCHROTRON LIGHT POWER)


• MANY FAILURES:


-OVERHEATED CF GASKETS -WELD FAILURES (REPEATED THERMAL CYCLES)

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• THE LEP ENERGY UPGRADE: -WELD FAILURES: • CLASSIC WELD 304 L TUBE / 316 LN FLANGE






N. HILLERET Failures and misconceptions


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• THE LEP ENERGY UPGRADE: -ORIGIN • FORGOTTEN WEAK ELEMENT + • IMPROPER WELD PREPARATION: MASSIVE<-> THIN PIECES

> • =>LACK OF PENETRATION FOR THE MASSIVE PART

• WELDING LIPS PREFERABLE





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• THE LEP ENERGY UPGRADE: -LESSONS: • PROVISIONAL IS DANGEROUS AND MUST BE TRACED

• WELL ORGANISED DATABASE OF COMPONENTS : =>EASY TO FIND PIECES WITH SIMILAR GEOMETRIES

• STANDARDISATION OF ESTABLISHED GOOD PRACTICE/RECEPIES e.g. FOR WELD GEOMETRY

AND IMPOSE THEIR USE

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• VENTING

-TYPICAL CASE

• ROUTINE ACTIVITY

• CONSIDERED AS SIMPLE (OBVIOUS!!)

-**BUT...**

- COULD HELP YOU TO BECOME (VERY) POPULAR
- NUMEROUS EXAMPLES IN ALL ACCELERATORS OF MISHAPS
- COULD BECOME EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE : (DEMOUNTING/RINSING A SC MODULE)

-COMMON ERRORS

- WRONG PLACE (SECTOR)
- WRONG PRESSURE (COULD BE SPECTACULAR ON BELLOWS!)
- WRONG FLUX FOR CRITICAL COMPONENTS (DUST FREE PLACES, LARGE ELECTRODES...)

• VENTING -LESSONS

• PROPER LABELING OF VENTING VALVES

- COLLEAGUES CHECKING THE PRESSURE IN ADJACENT SECTORS DURING THE VENTING
- CAREFUL START OF GAS INJECTION : CHECK PRESSURE IN ADJACENT SECTORS
- TEAMS INFORMED OF ANOMALIES IN THE SECTORISATION (SECTOR VALVES BLOCKED OPEN)
- RELIABLE PRESSURE LIMITING SYSTEM (COULD BE AS SIMPLE AS A KF FLANGE WITHOUT COLLAR!)

COURTESY C. HAUVILLER
THE LHC CRYOGENIC LINE

LARGE COLLIDER OPERATING AT 1.9K
LIQUID HELIUM FEED
FLEXIBLE ELEMENTS
ALIGNMENT



• THERMAL MOVEMENTS (room temperature)






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• **STABILITY CALCULATIONS** -Calculated according to ASME code

Straight Pipe Under External Pressure

Center connector

Moment of inertia:

Connector	=	14562	mm^4	
L t _{pipe}	=		mm mm	(equivalent pipe thickness)
pd T	=	1 20	bar C	(68 F)
Do t	=		mm mm	
L / Do Do / t	=	0.777 108.86	-	
Factors : A	=	0.0132	-	Fig. G; ASME II, Part D, Subpart 3
В	=	15000	-	Fig. HA-1; ASME II, Part D, Subpart 3 (ALLOY 316)
$p_{a} = \frac{4 \cdot B}{3 \cdot \left(\frac{D_{0}}{t}\right)} =$		12.67	bar	
pd	_	1	bar	<
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• **RESULTS**

- –Initial installation without problem
- -Collapses after impacts
- -But later without external intervention



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










• DRIFT DURING THE PRODUCTION (TOOLING)









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
• CURE -2 REINFORCEMENT RINGS

• ORIGIN

• INAPPROPRIATE CODE FOR CALCULATIONS (thin walls)

• UNMONITORED DRIFT DURING FABRICATION

• Note: PRODUCED BY A SUB-CONCTRACTOR OF THE MAIN CONTRACTOR



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• LESSONS

-BYING "TURN KEY" SYSTEM IS NOT AS SIMPLE AS FORESEEN

-HENCE A CAREFUL FOLLOW UP OF PRODUCTION IS MANDATORY EVEN AT THE STAGE OF COMPONENTS

-THE QUALITY PLAN OF THE CONTRACTOR MUST BE CHECKED

-COMMON INSPECTIONS MUST BE MADE AT THE SUBCONTRACTORS

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• A LONG STORY IN ACCELERATORS -MILD MEDIUM • PROTECTED AGAINST AGGRESSIVE MEDIA (limited humidity) • NO AGGRESSIVE AGENTS (O₃ Nox. EXCEPTED) ALLOWED -RESISTANT MATERIALS : • STAINLESS STEELS

-NUMEROUS EXAMPLES IN ALL MACHINES -CAUSES KNOWN SINCE LONG -ALWAYS REAPPEARINGSOMETIMES FOR IDENTICAL REASONS !!

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• ALUMINUM

• COPPER


• **BUT**....

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• FIRST BELLOW STORY: ISR SUMMER 1980

• LEAK ON A QUAD CHAMBER (BELLOW) INSTALLED FOR 1 YEAR

• MATERIAL ST.STEEL 316 L • HEAVY OXIDATION VISIBLE WHERE THE BELLOWS WAS ACCESSIBLE



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• FIRST BELLOW STORY: ISR (COURTESY J.P. BACHER) • LEAK FROM OUTSIDE

• CLOSER....

• AND FROM INSIDE




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• ISR BELLOW: ORIGIN OF FAILURE

CULPRIT HAS LEFT TRACES
CORROSION BY BRAZING FLUX (*ZnCl₂)
ST.STEEL EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO CI PITTING




-BRAZING ACTIVITIES WITHOUT PROTECTION (and care) ON ADJACENT MAGNET

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• THE SPS HORROR SHOW (COURTESY M. JIMENEZ) -400 GeV SYNCHROTRON (LHC INJECTOR)

- FIXED TARGET PHYSICS
- •HIGH RADIATION AREA (5x10⁵ Gray/year)
- ALL ST. STEEL CONSTRUCTION (304 L)



• THE SPS HORROR SHOW -SEEN FROM "RADIATION SAFE" DISTANCE: •NORMAL

• **BUT**.....





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• THE SPS HORROR SHOW -CLOSER



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THE SPS HORROR SHOW - OTHER EXAMPLES



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• THE SPS HORROR SHOW

-VERY COSTLY:

- TIME LOST FOR EXPERIMENTS
- MORE THAN 25 INTERVENTIONS OF THE VACUUM PIQUET IN 6 WEEKS (>4/WEEK!)
- HIGH RADIATION ZONE ⇒ 27 PEOPLES INVOLVED SHARING 21 mSv
- REPLACEMENT OF A COMPLETE SECTOR (30 m)
 - » 13 CHAMBERS AND 14 BELLOWS MANUFACTURED AND EXCHANGED IN ONLY 5 DAYS

• CHAMBERS PROTECTED BY ALUMINUM FOIL



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• THE SPS HORROR SHOW: ORIGIN

-MOST DAMAGES ON TOP OF COMPONENTS: CABLE TRAY


-NOTE DISCOLORATION!!



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
• THE SPS HORROR SHOW: ORIGIN




-THE FIRE DETECTION PIPE WAS MADE OF PVC!!!

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
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THE LEP BELLOWS:
A bellows in LEP injection region (high radiation area)
Leak position:
Presence of chlorine



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


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• THE LEP BELLOWS: ORIGIN

- SIGNAL NEEDED FOR THE INJECTION TIMING
- TRIGGER GIVEN BY A PHOTOMULTIPLIER
- TRANSPARENCY <=> MORE SENSITIVITY
- •=> BELLOWS IDEAL
- PHOTOMULTIPLIER AS CLOSE AS
 POSSIBLE TO THE BEAM
- => TOUCHING THE BELLOW



-BUT

• THE ADHESIVE BLACK TAPE AROUND THE PHOTOMUTILPIER CONTAINED CHLORINE (PVC BASED)!

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FAILURES AND MISCONCEPTIONS

CONCLUSIONS

-DESCRIBED FAILURES ORIGINATE FROM WELL KNOWN MISCONCEPTIONS

- -EVERY FAILURE MUST BE INVESTIGATED, EXPLAINED AND RECORDED
- -GOOD PRACTICE DIFFICULT TO INTRODUCE BEFORE FAILURE -HABITS (EVEN BAD) TEND TO PERPETUATE:

• "ONE HAS ALWAYS DONE LIKE THIS"

-"TURN KEY SYSTEMS" ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTROL

FAILURES AND MISCONCEPTIONS

CONCLUSIONS

-DEVELOP INTERNAL STANDARDS FOR ENGINEERING AND CRITICAL PRODUCTION/OPERATION STEPS (e.g. WELDING, CLEANING, VENTING, BAKING...)

...AND HAVE THEM APPLIED!!

-PERIODIC REVIEW OF LAYOUTS, PROCEDURES AND INTERLOCKS TO ELIMINATE OBSOLETE (DANGEROUS) SITUATION

> •A GOOD WALK IN THE ACCELERATOR IS HEALTHY FOR THE SUPERVISOR AND.. THE ACCELERATOR

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