Machine Protection
Basics of Accelerator Science and Technology at CERN

Markus Zerlauth with acknowledgements to M. Lamont, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger and many other CERN colleagues
Outline

• Introduction
• Stored energy & interaction with matter
• Machine protection design
• Example from LHC
• The unexpected
• Summary
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Safety in accelerators - definitions

Accelerators, as all other technical systems, must respect some general principles with respect to safety:

- Protect the people (legal requirements).
- Protect the environment (legal requirements).
- Protect the equipment (asset management).
  - Without beam: superconducting magnets, high power equipment, power cables, normal conducting magnets, RF systems, etc.
  - With beam: damage caused by beams.

Those 3 aspects may be coupled in some circumstances!

This presentation on “Machine Protection” is focused on equipment protection from damage caused by beams.
Trends in modern accelerators

- All major accelerator projects are pushed to new records.
- Higher beam energy and intensity:
  - Hadron colliders – LHC.
  - Linear e+e- colliders.
  - CERN Future Circular Colliders study.
- Higher power and brightness:
  - Neutron spallation sources.
  - Neutrino physics.
  - Synchrotron light sources (synchrotron light power).

>> the energy (density) stored in the beams increases!

In many modern projects machine protection aspects have a large impact on (or may even dominate) design and operation.
Risks and machine protection

- Protection is required since there is (always!) some risk

\[
\text{Risk} = \text{probability of an accident} \times \text{consequences (in Euro, downtime, radiation doses)}.
\]

- Probability of an uncontrolled beam loss:
  - What are the failures that lead to beam loss into equipment?
  - What is the probability for the failure modes?

- Consequences:
  - Damage to equipment.
  - Downtime of the accelerator for repair.
  - Activation of material, dose to personnel.

>> The higher the risk, the more protection and/or mitigation becomes important!
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Technological Challenges

...To see the rarest events...
LHC needs high luminosity of $10^{34}$ [cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$]
3 $\times$ $10^{14}$ p per beam

Collisions generate PetaBytes of data Per year

... to get 7 TeV operation...
LHC needs 8.3 Tesla dipole fields with circumference of 27 kms (16.5 miles)

... to get 8.3 Tesla ...
LHC needs super-conducting magnets <2°K (-271°C)
with an operational current of $\approx$13kA
cooled in super fluid helium
maintained in a vacuum

World's largest machine

1 ppm

10x less pressure than on moon surface

A magnet will QUENCH with milliJoule deposited energy

Stored energy per beam is 360 MJ
Stored energy in the magnet circuits is 9 GJ

two orders of magnitude higher than others

particle fluence near machine demands radiation-tolerant electronics

particle fluence near machine demands radiation-tolerant electronics
The LHC at the Energy Frontier

LHC design: 360 MJ
4 TeV: \(~140\) MJ
6.5 TeV: \(>280\) MJ

LHC beams become really dangerous in the SPS

Energy stored in the beam [MJ]

Momentum [GeV/c]

LHC magnets
LHC at injection
SPS transfer to LHC
LHC ions
ISR
PS LHC beam
RHIC proton
SNS
LEP2
SPS ppbar
TEVATRON

2/9/2017
M.Zerlauth - CAS 2016
Relevant parameter for MPS

- Momentum of the particle
- Particle type
  - Activation of material is mainly an issue for hadron accelerators.
- Energy stored in the beam
  - 360MJ per beam in the LHC when fully filled with 2808 bunches
- Beam power
- Beam size
- Time structure of beam

One LHC beam = 360 MJ = ?

The kinetic energy of a 200 m long train at 155 km/hour

- 90 kg of TNT
- 8 litres of gasoline
- 15 kg of chocolate

2/9/2017

M.Zerlauth - CAS 2016
Energy stored in Magnet Powering System of the LHC

\[ E_{\text{kin}} (v = 27 \text{ kn}) \approx E_{\text{LHC main circuits}} \text{ (@6.5 TeV)} \]
Beam loss in materials

- Lost particles induce particle cascades in materials they traverse.
  - The peak energy deposition can be deep in the material at the maximum of the hadron / electromagnetic shower.
  - Particle showers from hadrons with energies of 100’s of GeV to some TeV have a penetration depth of several meters.

- The energy deposition leads to a temperature increase, and for very fast losses to shock waves and to plastic deformation.
  - Material can melt, vaporize, deform or lose its mechanical properties.
  - Limited risk for some 10 kJ, large risk for some MJ.
  - Equipment becomes activated due to beam losses.
  - Superconducting magnets can quench (become normal-conducting).
Small but already dangerous

- Damage @ Linac4 with a 3 MeV beam – vacuum leak.

- Failure combination:
  - Beam misaligned
  - Unlucky magnet setting
  - Aperture limitation at bellow

At such low energies, the local energy loss per proton is very high
⇒ Damage after some integration time
SPS dipole magnet

A real case from the 2008 SPS run!

- Impact on the vacuum chamber of a 400 GeV beam of $3 \times 10^{13}$ protons (2 MJ).
- Event is due to an insufficient coverage of the SPS MPS (known!).
- Vacuum chamber to atmospheric pressure, downtime ~ 3 days.

Risk = (3 days downtime + dose to workers) x (1 event / 5-10 years)
Release of 600MJ at the LHC

The 2008 LHC accident happened during test runs without beam.

A magnet interconnect was defect and the circuit opened. An electrical arc provoked a He pressure wave damaging ~600 m of LHC, polluting the beam vacuum over more than 2 km.

Risk = (1 year downtime + repair of 50 magnets + CERN reputation) x (1 event / 1000? years)
Controlled damage tests for MP

- In the past decade a lot of effort was invested to better understand the interaction of high energy / high density beams with matter.

- Experiments:
  - Ad-hoc experiments for the LHC
  - Construction of a dedicated test facility at CERN (HiRadMat @ SPS)

- Modeling and comparison with tests.
  - Many matter phases (solid, liquid, plasma), ‘hydro-dynamic-codes’

- Some outcomes:
  - Validation of LHC carbon collimator robustness
  - Validation of damage thresholds for LHC injection energy
  - Validation of simulation codes
  - Search for more robust material
SPS experiment: damage at 450GeV

Controlled SPS experiment / protons.

- Energy 450 GeV,
- Beam area $\sigma_x \times \sigma_y = 1.1 \times 0.6 \text{ mm}^2$
- Damage limit for copper at $2 \times 10^{12}$ p.
- No damage to stainless steel.

Damage limit is $\sim 200 \text{ kJ}$, less than 0.1% of a nominal LHC beam.

Impact D: $\approx 1/3$ of nominal LHC injection.

V. Kain et al

Special target (sandwich of Tin, Steel, Copper plates)
HiRadMat tests – new materials

*Courtesy A. Bertarelli (EN)*

- Inermet 180, 72 bunches
- Molybdenum, 72 & 144 bunches
- Glidcop, 72 bunches (2 x)
- Copper-Diamond 144 bunches
- Molybdenum-Copper-Diamond 144 bunches
- Molybdenum-Graphite (3 grades) 144 bunches
HighRadMat test with high intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Bunches</th>
<th>p/bunch</th>
<th>Total Intensity</th>
<th>Beam Sigma</th>
<th>Specimen Slot</th>
<th>Velocity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simulation</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.5e11</td>
<td>9.0e12 p</td>
<td>2.5 mm</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>316 m/s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.26e11</td>
<td>9.0e12 p</td>
<td>1.9 mm</td>
<td>8 (partly 9)</td>
<td>~275 m/s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inermet: comparison between simulation and experiment

Courtesy A. Bertarelli (EN)
Hydrodynamic tunneling

- Excellent agreement between simulations and experimental results – proving existence of hydrodynamic tunneling process in case of the LHC beam (~ 35 m in copper).
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• **Machine protection design**
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Main objectives of MP³ design

- Protect the machine
  Highest priority is to avoid damage of the accelerator.

- Protect the beam
  Complex protection systems reduce the availability of the accelerator, the number of “false” interlocks stopping operation must be minimized.
  Trade-off between protection and operation.

- Provide the evidence
  Clear (post-mortem) diagnostics must be provided when:
  the protection systems stop operation,
  something goes wrong (failure, damage, but also ‘near misses’).
Beam loss

In accelerators, particles are lost due to a variety of reasons: beam gas interaction, losses from collisions, losses of the beam halo, ...

- Some (continuous) beam losses are inherent to the operation of accelerators.
  - Taken into account during the design of the accelerator.
  - Max. loss rates may be given by the design:
    - Prevent magnet quenches (LHC).
    - Allow maintenance (residual contact radiation).

- Accidental beam losses are due to a multitude of failures mechanisms.

Analysis and structure required!
Failure classification

- **Failure type:**
  - Hardware failure (power converter trip, magnet quench, AC distribution failure, object in vacuum chamber, vacuum leak, RF trip, ...).
  - Controls failure (wrong data, wrong magnet current function, trigger problem, timing system, feedback failure, ..).
  - Operational failure (chromaticity / tune / orbit errors, ...).
  - Beam instability (high beam / bunch current).

- **Failure parameters:**
  - Damage potential.
  - Probability for the failure.
  - Time constant for beam loss.

- **Machine state (when failure occurs):**
  - Linac, beam transfer, injection and extraction (single pass).
  - Stored beam.

Mixture defines the risk and the criticality for MP
MPS Design strategy

- Avoid a failure by design – if you can.

- Detect a failure at the hardware (equipment) level and stop operation – first protection layer.

- Detect the consequences of the failure on beam parameters (orbit, tune, losses etc) and stop operation – second protection layer.

- Stop beam operation.
  - Inhibit injection,
  - Send beam to a dump,
  - Stop the beam by collimators / absorbers.

- Elements of protection:
  - Equipment and beam monitoring,
  - Collimators and absorbers,
  - Beam dumps,
  - Interlock system linking different systems.
Passive vs active protection

**Passive protection**
- Collimators.
- Masks.
- Absorbers.
- Dumps.

Obstacles to absorb the energy

**Active protection**
- Equipment surveillance.
- Beam observation.
- Extraction (dump) kickers.

Detection of a failure directly on the equipment or by its effects on the beam.

Modern MP systems usually require both passive and active protection to cover all failure cases.
Failure time scales in circular machines

- Single turn (single-passage) beam loss
  - Failures of kicker magnets (injection, extraction kicker magnets).
  - Transfer failures between two accelerators or from an accelerator to a target station.

- Very fast beam loss (μs - ms)
  - Multi turn beam losses in rings.
  - Large variety of possible failures, mostly in the magnet powering system, with a typical time constant of some 10 turns to many milli-seconds

- Fast beam loss

- Slow beam loss
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   Example from LHC

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LHC and its Design Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Beam energy</td>
<td>7 TeV</td>
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<tr>
<td>transv. norm. emittance</td>
<td>3.75 μm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beta*</td>
<td>0.55 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP beam size</td>
<td>16.7 μm</td>
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<tr>
<td>bunch intensity</td>
<td>$1.15 \times 10^{11}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>luminosity / bunch</td>
<td>$3.6 \times 10^{30}$ cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$</td>
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<tr>
<td># bunches</td>
<td>2808</td>
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<tr>
<td>bunch spacing</td>
<td>25 ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beam current</td>
<td>0.582 A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rms bunch length</td>
<td>7.55 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crossing angle</td>
<td>285 μrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Piwinski angle”</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>luminosity</td>
<td>$10^{34}$ cm$^{-2}$s$^{-1}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LHC Design Parameters

- Ionization chambers are used to detect beam losses:
  - Very fast reaction time ~ ½ turn (40 us)
  - Very large dynamic range (> 10^6)
- ~3600 chambers (BLMS) are distributed over the LHC to detect beam losses and trigger a beam abort!
- BLMs are good for almost all failures as long as they last ~ a few turns (few 0.1 ms) or more!
The LHC requires a complex multi-stage collimation system to avoid high energy particles to hit aperture limits and/or provoke quenches of sc magnets.

- Previous hadron machines used collimators only for experimental background conditions.

Almost 100 collimators, mostly made of Carbon and Tungsten, protect the superconducting magnets against energy deposition from the beam.

Up to 360 MJ in each beam versus few mJ to quench a magnet.
Collimation System

- To be able to absorb the energy of the (high energy) protons, the collimators are staged – primary, secondary, tertiary – multi-stage system.

- The system worked perfectly – also thanks to excellent beam stabilization and machine reproducibility – only one setup / year.
  - \( \sim 99.99\% \) of the protons that were lost from the beam were intercepted.
  - **No magnet was quenched in operation at 3.5/4 TeV, only a few beam induced quenches at 6.5TeV**
The BLM signals near the experiments are almost as high at the collimators (steady losses) due to the luminosity (in fact the physics at small angles not covered by the experiments !!)
LHC beam dumping system

When it is time to get rid of the beams (also in case of emergency!), the beams are ‘kicked’ out of the ring by a system of kicker magnets and send into a dump block!
LHC dump line
LHC dump block

The dump block is the only LHC element capable of absorbing the nominal beam.

Low density graphite sheets
The (ideal) end for each LHC beam

- A beam screen installed in front of the dump provides monitoring of the dump execution.
- The shape of the beam impact is checked against prediction at each dump!
Failure analysis process – step 1

Let us pick an example for the LHC

- Step 1: Figure out what can go wrong...
  - Requires good understanding of accelerator physics: how does a given element affect the beam?
  - Requires good understanding of the hardware: time scales, failure modes?
  - Requires a complete overview of all machine equipment that affect the beam.
  - The analysis must be done systematically for every system, from bottom up – including the software/controls.
Failure analysis process – step 2

- Step 2: Identify a critical element – the D1’s (separation/re-combination dipoles around the high luminosity experiments)

LHC room temperature (normal conducting) separation/recombination dipoles (‘D1’) around ATLAS and CMS.

Those magnets are very strong (large deflections) and they are fast → good candidates
Failure analysis process – step 3

Step 3: Simulate the failure.
- 12 magnets are powered in series.
- Large betatron function when squeezed \((b > 2000 \text{ m})\) → large orbit changes.
- Short time constant \(t = 2.5 \text{ seconds} \) (\(B\) is the magnetic field):

\[
B(t) = B_0 e^{-t/\tau}
\]

Simulated orbit change along the LHC ring a few milliseconds after failure.

It does not fit!
Step 4: Identify mitigation strategy

- The simulations indicate absence of redundancy (we only have beam loss monitors) and very short reaction times for BLMs → we want an extra-layer of protection at the equipment level.
- This analysis triggered the development of so-called FMCMs (Fast Magnet Current change Monitor) that provide protection against fast magnet current changes after powering failures - CERN - DESY/Hamburg collaboration.

- Very fast detection (< 1 ms) of voltage changes on the circuit. Tolerances of ~ $10^{-4}$ on $dl/I$ are achievable.
Failure analysis process – step 5

- Step 5: Commissioning and validation
  - Switch off D1 PC – simulated failure.

Failure trigger

[Graph showing current (I) over time (Time) with a simulated failure trigger and a FMCM trigger where $\frac{dI}{I} < 10^{-4}$]
Failure analysis process – step 6

- Step 6: Real test with beam – no FMCM
  - Low intensity (‘safe’) test beam.
  - Switch off D1 PC – simulated failure.
  - Beams dumped by the LHC BLMs when beams hit the collimators

From the LHC Post-Mortem system
Failure analysis process – step 7

- Step 7: Real test with beam – with FMCM
  - Low intensity (‘safe’) test beam.
  - Switch off D1 PC – simulated failure.
  - Beam dumped by FMCM.

 Orbit change in mm

No measurable orbit change

LHC turn number

Beam dump!

From the LHC Post-Mortem system
Failure timescales + protection at the LHC

Time

- 10000 turns = 0.89 s
- 1000 turns
- 100 turns
- 10 turns
- 1 turn = 89 us

Failures and protection

Operational ‘mistakes’

Quenches

NC magnet powering failures

Transverse feedback

Kicker magnets

Quench protection

Power converter interlocks

FMCM

BLMs

BPMs

Absorbers
Learning curve

- It took more than a year of commissioning and tuning (e.g. BLM thresholds) to reach the maximum intensity at 3.5/4 TeV /6.5 TeV.
- ‘Only’ in the second half of 2015 and after the splice consolidation during the first long shut-down we approached design energies.
- Design luminosity of 1E34 cm-2s-2 exceeded during 2016 operation.

- 2011: 50 ns (1380b)
- 2012: 50 ns (1380b), >b int
- 2015: 25 ns (2244b)
- 2016: 25 ns (2072b), BCMS

Legend:
- 2011
- 2012
- 2015
- 2016

Graph:
- Stored energy (MJ)
- Time (May to Nov)
The MPS systems continue to learn as well

- MPS architecture is constantly evolving, today many 10,000 interlock conditions can request an abort of the beams
- In addition every year some 100 major changes to operational systems that require tracking and follow-up (threshold changes, maintenance/replacement of components, R2E, operational tools, procedures,...)
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UFO
- (suspected) dust particles interacting with beam
- Beam losses and potential magnet quenches (quench limit at 7TeV)!
- Mitigated by threshold optimisation

ULO (Unidentified Lying Object)
- Aperture limitation in LHC dipole magnet 15R8
- Mitigated by orbit bump

Radiation to electronics
- Non-rad hard components used in LS1 upgrade
- Mitigation measures (shielding, relocation...)

Physics aperture at MB.15R8

~9.4mm

~400 hours Downtime

~12 LHC Bumps

http://atl.lhcb.cern
The less expected...

**BIRDS & WEASELS**
- Electrical fault in 66kV surface substation
- Mitigated by repair and additional protection

**PS MAIN POWER SUPPLY**
- Short in capacitor storage bank
- Mitigated by network reconfiguration and operation of rotating machine

**SPS BEAM DUMP**
- Limited to 96 bunches per injection
- 2076 (2200) bunches per beam cf. 2750
- Replacement during EYETS
The less expected...

**Magnet Training to 7TeV**

- Magnets from firm 3 are very slow (re-)trainers / small preservation of memory
- Compatible with scenario where at each warm-up we have to re-start as for previous training
- Strategy to limit mechanical and electrical stresses during quench training campaigns

---

### Best estimate for 7 TeV (first q. only)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>sector</th>
<th>1000</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>3000</th>
<th>total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firm-1, Reception</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firm-2, Reception</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-3, Reception</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-1, LHC (5 quenches)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firm-2, LHC (27 quenches)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firm-3, LHC (143 quenches)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHC</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHC</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Reception**

- About 8x faster (as expected)
- Only 1.3x faster
- Extrapolation to 7 TeV (12 kA) very tricky

---

- 6.5 TeV + margin
- Best estimate for 7 TeV (first q. only)
- LHC 20 100 325 445
- Done to do
- 7 21
- 17 27
- 15 25
- 49 24
- 16 57
- 20 36
- 21 51
- 28 30
- 173 272
Magnet Circuits and earth faults

- Several earth faults to ground (cold and warm part) during commissioning and operation
- 1 week of downtime due to short in dipole circuit of sector 34
- August 2016 spent 2 days investigating and mitigating potential inter-turn short

Commissioning
- RB.A56
  - 2 intermittent earth faults during CSCM – disappeared
  - 1 intermittent earth fault after training – disappeared
- RB.A34
  - Active water coupling nut vs. grounded surface on surrounding infrastructure
- RQF.A12
  - Active water coupling nut vs. grounded surface on surrounding infrastructure
- RB.A34
  - Diode pot saga (“to burn or not to burn”)
- RQX.L1
  - Instrumentation cable burnt

Beam operation
- RB.A78
  - 8 h LHC downtime on 8/7/2015
  - 5 h LHC downtime on 10/8/2015
  - 19 h LHC downtime on 11/8/2015
  - Water coupling nut/ 2x earth detection card
- RQF.A78
  - 5 h LHC downtime on 13/10/2015
  - Water leak
- RCS.A78B2
  - 9 h LHC downtime on 18/7/2015
  - 10 min LHC downtime on 13/8/2015 (not incl. pre-cycle)
  - Under investigation
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Summary

Machine protection:

- requires a comprehensive overview of all aspects of the accelerator (accelerator physics, operation, equipment, instrumentation),
- requires understanding the different failure types that could lead to uncontrolled beam loss,
- affects many aspects of accelerator construction and operation,
- must be an integral part of the machine design,
- is becoming increasingly important for future projects, with increased beam power / energy density and increasingly complex machines.
Excellent performance of LHC and its machine protection systems during first 5 years of commissioning and exploitation, allowing to exceed design luminosity (despite limitations)

Injector upgrade and HL-LHC projects will imply as well new MP challenges
Stored energies - the future
Thank you for your attention!

Questions?
SPARE SLIDES
The beam is gone immediately – isn’t it?

- Unfortunately even the best failure detection takes some time, the signal must be propagated to the dumping system, the dumping system must synchronize to the beam.
  - Unavoidable delay to fire the dump!

At the LHC the delay can be as much as \(~3\) turns – \(~300\) us
A few other challenges

Very bright beams, very high bunch population, very high beam current

- Beam stability
  - New low impedance collimators
- Beam lifetime & loss spikes
  - Magnet quenches
- Machine protection
  - Failure scenarios - local beam impact - equipment damage
  - Quench protection
- Machine availability
  - Radiation to electronics (SEUs etc.)...
Civil Engineering
2 new 300-metre service tunnels and 2 shafts near to ATLAS and CMS.

“Crab” Cavities
10 superconducting “crab” cavities for each of the ATLAS and CMS experiments to tilt the beams before collisions.

Focusing Magnets
12 more powerful quadrupole magnets for each of the ATLAS and CMS experiments, designed to increase the concentration of the beams before collisions.

Superconducting Links
Electrical transmission lines based on a high-temperature superconductor to carry current to the magnets from the new service tunnels near ATLAS and CMS.

Collimators
15 to 20 new collimators and 60 replacement collimators to reinforce machine protection.

Bending Magnets
4 pairs of shorter and more powerful dipole bending magnets to free up space for the new collimators.
**August 2008**
First injection test

**Sept. 10, 2008**
First beams around

**Sept. 19, 2008**
Disaster

**October, 2011**
3.5x10^33, 5.7 fb^{-1}

**November 29, 2009**
First Hints!!

**November 2010**
Pb^{82+} Ions

**June 28 2011**
1380 bunches

**March 30, 2010**
First collisions at 3.5 TeV

**March 14th 2012**
Restart with Beam

**May 2012**
Ramping Performance

**November 2011**
Second Ion Run

**Feb. 2013**
p-Pb^{82+} New Operation Mode

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<thead>
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<th>2008</th>
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<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td><strong>2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
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Dipole training campaign

Q3/2014-Apr2015

5th April
1st Beam

10th April
Beam at 6.5 TeV

3rd June – First SB

2244

28th Oct. - SB with record \( N_b \)

July-August SEU on QPS

1st B E A M

2015

UFO conditioning (?)

Pb-Pb at \( \sqrt{s_{NN}} = 5.02 \) TeV

IONS at the end

IONS at the end

4 fb-1

YETS

E- cloud

2016
Squeeze in ATLAS/CMS

- Lower beta* implies larger beams in the triplet magnets
- Larger beams implies a larger crossing angle
- Aperture concerns dictate caution – experience counts

Image courtesy
John Jowett

**Beam envelope vs mechanical aperture in triplet and EXP**
Then enjoy some remarkable availability

Introduced in Run2 a common metrics and tracking of LHC downtime and root causes -> cern.ch/aft

Rigorous analysis and exploitation of data for availability optimization of individual subsystems
Availability: 11\textsuperscript{th} June – 23\textsuperscript{rd} July

Many nice, long fills, collecting up to 0.5fb\textsuperscript{-1} in a single fill
Integrated luminosity

- ~20 fb\(^{-1}\) delivered to ATLAS & CMS
- 3 fb\(^{-1}\)/very good week

2016 objectives
The expected...

- **Head-on beam-beam effect** not a major limitation
- Long range beam-beam to be taken seriously
  - Crossing angle for sufficient separation in order of $10^{-12} \sigma$ (otherwise bad lifetime & beam loss)
    - Reduces long-range beam-beam interactions
    - Reduces beam-beam tune spread and resonances
    - Reduction of mechanical aperture
    - Reduction of luminous region
    - Reduction of overlap and instantaneous luminosity

![Diagram showing beam-beam interactions and separation angles.](image)
Operational Scenario for HL-LHC

$L \left[ 10^{34} \text{ cm}^{-2}\text{s}^{-1} \right]$

- no leveling w peak $2 \times 10^{35} \text{ cm}^{-2}\text{s}^{-1}$
  - Event pile-up in experiments $>200$
- leveling at $5 \times 10^{34} \text{ cm}^{-2}\text{s}^{-1}$
- nominal $1 \times 10^{34} \text{ cm}^{-2}\text{s}^{-1}$

Levelling with crab-cavity
HL-LHC Collimation upgrades

HL-LHC will bring higher bunch intensity, higher luminosity, higher radiation and potentially higher losses -> Collimation upgrades required
(Complete) PS Accelerator complex

AD Hall
(Antiproton Decelerator)

Isolde
(Radioactive Ion beam facility)

East Hall
(irradiation facilities)

CTF3
(CLIC test facility)

Linac2:
33 m, 50 MeV, 1978
L/C (m), Energy after acceleration, Commissioning year

n-ToF
(neutron time of flight facility)
LHC in numbers: big, cold, high energy

- 1720 Power converters
- > 10000 magnetic elements
- 7568 Quench detection systems
- 1088 Beam position monitors
- ~4000 Beam loss monitors
- 350 MJ stored beam energy in 2015
- 1.2 GJ magnetic energy per sector at 6.5 TeV

- 150 tonnes helium, ~90 tonnes at 1.9 K

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- 26.7km circumference
- 20km filled with sc magnets @ 8.3T
- Beam needs 90 us for one turn
Incidents happen

JPARC home page – January 2014

2013.07.26 Message from Director of J-PARC Center

We have been working together to investigate the causes of the accident and to develop the efficient safety management system to prevent recurrence of similar accidents since the radioactive material leak accident at the Hadron Experimental Facility (HD Facility) on May 23.
Due to a power converter failure, a slow extraction was transformed into a fast extraction.

- Extraction in milliseconds instead of seconds.

As a consequence of the high peak power a target was damaged and radio-isotopes were released into experimental halls.

>> machine protection coupled to personnel protection!

Investigations and protection improvements delayed the restart of the JPARC complex for ~7-8 months. JPARC is just restarting.

One insufficiently covered failure case had major consequences!